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DOG WHISTLING, THE COLOR-BLIND
JURISPRUDENTIAL REGIME, AND THE
CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS OF RACE
DOG WHISTLE POLITICS: HOW CODED RACIAL
APPEALS HAVE REINVENTED RACISM AND
WRECKED THE MIDDLE CLASS. By Ian Haney
López. 1 New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press. 2014. Pp.
ix + 277. $24.95 (cloth).
Calvin TerBeek

2

Ian Haney López’s new book, Dog Whistle Politics: How
Coded Racial Appeals Have Reinvented Racism and Wrecked the
Middle Class, has a provocative thesis. López contends that dog
whistling, that is, coded racial rhetoric, “explains how politicians
backed by concentrated wealth manipulate racial appeals to win
elections and also to win support for regressive policies that help
corporations and the super-rich, and in the process wreck the
middle class” (p. xii). López does not ignore other factors that led
to the rise of the New Right political regime, but to him, dog
whistling is first among equals (pp. 7–8, 29–30). If this thesis holds
up to scrutiny, it has much explanatory purchase, not only for
understanding ordinary or “low” politics, but perhaps for helping
us navigate the Court’s turn to racial conservatism over the past
40-plus years.
López’s argument is consonant with the relevant literature.
“Many white Americans hold negative views of African
Americans, and these racial predispositions are powerful
3
predictors of opinions on a host of political issues.” Or as Rogers
Smith and Desmond King put it in their elegant study: “on issue
1. John H. Boalt Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley.
2. J.D., Tulane University. Calvin TerBeek has clerked for state and federal court
judges, litigated for a Vault 100 firm and a boutique law firm; he is currently a prospective
Ph.D. student.
3. Gregory A. Huber & John S. Lapinski, The “Race Card” Revisited: Assessing
Racial Priming in Policy Contests, 50 AM. J. POL. SCI. 421, 421 (2006) (citing studies by
Lawrence Bobo and Martin Gilens among others).
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after issue involving a wide range of the most foundational
structures in American life, almost all of the same actors have
lined up on one side or the other of positions framed by support
for or opposition to race-conscious policies designed to alleviate
4
material racial inequalities.” However, when one digs down
further, López’s argument cannot carry all the water he claims. As
we will see, dog whistling has perhaps given politicians a new way
to talk about race, but dog whistling has not “wrecked” the middle
class. What is more, López does not advance the ball in
understanding the Supreme Court’s latest iteration of racial
5
conservatism.
But this hardly obviates the interest with which we should
engage López’s argument. López has identified an interesting
aspect of contemporary politics, and has ably told a story integral
to understanding the politics of race. When one party is as racially
homogenous as the modern Republican Party—eighty-eight
percent of the people who voted for Republican presidential
candidate Mitt Romney were white (p. 1)—surely race must have
some explanatory factor. Moreover, as Jack Balkin recently
noted, the two major political parties have not been this polarized
6
since the Civil War. López has then perhaps identified one of the
culprits—dog whistle racism.
The careful reader will have noticed that López’s explicit
thesis is about politicians, but the Court plays a role in his story as
well. However, López’s analysis of the Court is discursive. This is
unfortunate. To fully vet López’s thesis, we need to include the
Supreme Court—a political actor (high politics, yes, but a political
institution nonetheless)—as a central player. That is, if we are to
fully understand López’s claim and finger the dog whistling
coming from all relevant political actors, we need to look at what
the Supreme Court has been doing to support the policies of racial
conservatives. As Cornell Clayton and J. Mitchell Pickerill have
put it: “[r]ather than a check on majority power, the federal courts
often function as arenas for extending, legitimizing, harmonizing
or protecting the policy agenda of political elites or groups within
7
the dominant governing coalition.”
4. DESMOND S. KING & ROGERS M. SMITH, STILL A HOUSE DIVIDED: RACE AND
POLITICS IN OBAMA’S AMERICA 258 (2011).
5. Id. at 35–89.
6. Jack M. Balkin, The Last Days of Disco: Why the American Political System is
Dysfunctional, 101 B.U. L. REV. 1159, 1189 (2014).
7. Cornell W. Clayton & J. Mitchell Pickerill, The Politics of Criminal Justice: How
the New Right Regime Shaped the Rehnquist Court’s Criminal Justice Jurisprudence, 94
GEO. L.J 1385, 1391 (2006).
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What is more, perhaps some of the justices engage in dog
whistling of a jurisprudential sort. Recall that Justice Scalia, in
2011, writing in dissent in Brown v. Plata (the California prison
case) stated: “many [of the released prisoners] will undoubtedly
be fine physical specimens who have developed intimidating
8
muscles pumping iron in the prison gym.” This rhetoric was
pointless to any legal issue presented in the case and was both
9
anachronistic and largely inaccurate. To give one more example:
we know that President Reagan wanted to appoint antiaffirmative action judges to the federal courts such that the
judiciary could carry out the “politically charged” work of ending
10
affirmative action. Thus, it is crucial to address the Supreme
11
Court for a full examination of racial conservatism.
This review essay will proceed in the following fashion: I will
follow López’s political narrative, stopping, as he does, at each
successive presidential election, but I will supplement his
analysis—and, where needed, question it—with an assessment of
what the Court was doing during and in between the elections in
regard to race and constitutional politics. In other words, we need
12
to analyze what I will call the color-blind jurisprudential regime
of the New Right—is this regime acting in concert with
Republican elites to help implement racial conservatives’
preferences?
Before beginning, though, let us set forth a full-fledged
definition of our analytical set-piece: what is dog whistling? López
gives a lengthy definition of dog whistle politics complete with a
fighting metaphor (pp. 3-5). The most insightful aspect of López’s
definition is the plausible deniability it gives its users because the
8. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1953 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
9. Brian Palmer, Do Prisoners Really Spend All Their Time Lifting Weights?, SLATE
(May
24,
2011,
6:02
PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/
explainer/2011/05/do_prisoners_really_spend_all_their_time_lifting_weights.html.
10. KING & SMITH, supra note 4, at 124.
11. For an important caveat to the regime politics approach, see Matthew E.K. Hall,
Rethinking Regime Politics, 37 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 878 (2012) (arguing that the regime
politics literature does not conform to the Court’s actual actions when striking down
federal statutes); see also Thomas M. Keck, Party Politics or Judicial Independence? The
Regime Politics Literature Hits the Law Schools, 32 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 511 (2007)
(arguing that the regime politics literature can be overdeterministic when taken too far).
12. Howard Gillman, Regime Politics, Jurisprudential Regimes, and Unenumerated
Rights, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 107, 114 (2006) (defining a jurisprudential regime as “the way
in which judges translate their political ideologies and identities into a preferred legal
analysis. This legal analysis is made up of a set of rules, concepts, doctrines, precedents,
and tests that collectively establish a standard operating procedure for the treatment of
certain kinds of claims.”), citing Mark J. Richards & Herbert M. Kritzer, Jurisprudential
Regimes in Supreme Court Decision Making, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 305, 308 (2002).
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whistler never explicitly mentions race. But one would be hardpressed to improve on Lee Atwater’s infamous definition (which
López cites):
You start out in 1954 by saying, “Nigger, nigger, nigger.” By
1968 you can’t say “nigger”—that hurts you, backfires. So you
say stuff like, uh, forced busing, states’ rights, and all that stuff,
and you’re getting so abstract. Now, you’re talking about
cutting taxes, and all these things you’re talking about are
totally economic things and a byproduct of them is, blacks get
hurt worse than whites . . . . “We want to cut this,” is much more
abstract than even the busing thing, uh, and a hell of a lot more
13
abstract than “Nigger, nigger.”

The first politician that jumps to mind when reading
Atwater’s quote is George Wallace. López explains Wallace’s
14
electoral gambit (pp. 13-17), but the story of how the modern
political parties became racially identifiable (the Democrats as
racial liberals and the Republicans as racial conservatives), starts
in 1964, as López rightly notes. Political scientists have
persuasively shown this presidential election as the partisan
15
cleavage point in the modern era of racial politics.
At around this same time, “History’s Warren Court” (19621968) was hitting its stride. As Lucas Powe argues, the Warren
Court was a partner with the Kennedy and Johnson
13. Rick Perlstein, Exclusive: Lee Atwater’s Infamous 1981 Interview on the Southern
Strategy, THE NATION, Nov. 13, 2012, available at http://www.thenation.com
/article/170841/exclusive-lee-atwaters-infamous-1981-interview-southern-strategy#.
Perlstein also provides some useful context for Atwater’s remarks.
14. Wallace said after losing his 1958 gubernatorial bid in Alabama, “no other sonof-a-bitch will ever out-nigger me again” (p. 14). As Wallace biographer Dan T. Carter has
noted, there is some question whether this is the precise quote, but the weight of the
evidence tends in that direction. See DAN T. CARTER, THE POLITICS OF RAGE: GEORGE
WALLACE, THE ORIGINS OF THE NEW CONSERVATISM, AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN POLITICS 96 (1995).
15. The seminal study is EDWARD G. CARMINES & JAMES A. STIMSON, ISSUE
EVOLUTION: RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS 73 (1989)
(“[T]he 1964 campaign appears to have set in motion an issue realignment among
citizens.”). It would take us too far afield to review the events leadings up to 1964, but
some of the best work for understanding such includes: MICHAEL W. FLAMM, LAW AND
ORDER: STREET CRIME, CIVIL UNREST, AND THE CRISIS OF LIBERALISM IN THE 1960S
(2005); JOSEPH E. LOWNDES, FROM THE NEW DEAL TO THE NEW RIGHT: RACE AND THE
SOUTHERN ORIGINS OF MODERN CONSERVATISM (2008); Pamela Brandwein,
Reconstruction, Race, and Revolution, in RACE AND AMERICAN POLITICAL
DEVELOPMENT 125 (Joseph Lowndes, Julie Novkov & Dorian T. Warren eds., 2008);
Naomi Murakawa, The Origins of the Carceral Crisis: Racial Order as “Law and Order” in
Postwar American Politics, in RACE AND AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 234
(Joseph Lowndes, Julie Novkov & Dorian T. Warren eds., 2008); Vesla M. Weaver,
Frontlash: Race and the Development of Punitive Crime Policy, 21 STUDIES AM. POL. DEV.
230 (2007).
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Administrations in supporting the New Deal coalition and
dragging a recalcitrant South into line with national expectations
regarding its treatment of largely African American criminal
16
defendants. An in-depth history of the Warren Court’s criminal
procedure jurisprudence is unnecessary here (it has been
recounted countless times), but a reminder of its “greatest hits” is
17
18
useful: Gideon v. Wainwright, Escobedo v. Illinois, and
19
Miranda v. Arizona. These were the cases that the liberals
20
cheered and the conservatives blanched at.
21
And as much as liberalism seemed ascendant in 1964, not all
were on board. When Chief Justice Warren was invited to speak
at Georgia Tech University in 1963, “Bircher” Frank H. Benning
22
distributed signs imploring “Help Impeach Earl Warren.” These
were Goldwater voters. Movement conservatives in the “Draft
Goldwater” camp, with an efficiency that Lenin would have
admired, had systematically overtaken the levers of power in the
23
Republican Party and removed moderate Republican New York
Governor Nelson Rockefeller from serious consideration on
Goldwater’s way to the nomination. Citing no sources, López
contends that Goldwater “probably harbored prejudiced views”
(p. 35). The evidence suggests otherwise. Goldwater had been a
member of the NAACP, helped found the National Urban
League chapter in Phoenix, and was “a strong supporter of
24
voluntary integration.” Indeed, when his lagging campaign
created a political ad that was overtly racial, Goldwater refused to
run the ad, stating: “I’m not going to be made out to be a racist.
25
You can’t show it.”

16. LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS (2000).
17. 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding indigent criminal defendants are entitled to a lawyer
during trial).
18. 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (holding accused are entitled to a lawyer during police
interrogations under the Sixth Amendment).
19. 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (setting forth the procedures police must follow in order to
extract a confession from a suspect).
20. For a powerful critique of the unintended consequences of the Warren Court’s
criminal procedure revolution, see WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 227–36 (2011).
21. RICK PERLSTEIN, NIXONLAND 4 (2008) (“Lyndon Johnson had spent 1964, the
first year of his accidental presidency, redeeming the martyr: passing, with breathtaking
aplomb, a liberal legislative agenda that had only known existence as wish during John F.
Kennedy’s lifetime.”).
22. The South: Hello, Earl, TIME, Feb. 22, 1963, at 24.
23. LOWNDES, supra note 15, at 62.
24. FLAMM, supra note 15, at 36.
25. LOWNDES, supra note 15, at 75.
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But if Goldwater was not a racist, some of his supporters
26
decidedly were. And, at all events, López is correct that
Goldwater knew full well how to blow the dog whistle: “We’re not
going to get the Negro vote as a bloc in 1964 and 1968, so we ought
to go hunting where the ducks are,” Goldwater said (p. 18). Other
examples in historian Michael Flamm’s telling abound, including
Goldwater’s convention speech where he decried “the license of
27
the mob and of the jungle.” The jungle, needless to say, was the
urban environment. What is more, consistent with López’s
analysis, the Goldwater camp consistently denied that any of their
28
rhetoric was racialized in nature. Goldwater also attacked the
29
Supreme Court for its criminal procedure decisions. In reaction
to Escobedo, Goldwater invoked “law and order” and tied the
30
Court to the (putatively) rising crime rate. And it was none other
than a young staffer named William Rehnquist who devised a
“non-racial,” in Goldwater’s eyes, color-blind approach to the
31
issue of integration: the right to associate (or not) (pp. 83-84).
One might question, however, if Goldwater was not dog
whistling so much as, to mix metaphors, preaching to the already
racially conservative choir. Sociologist Katherine Beckett has
shown that it was political elites, like Goldwater, who raised the
issue of crime via the rhetoric of “law and order”—that is, crime
was not a concern in public opinion polls when Goldwater, among
32
others, began talking about it. However, as Beckett also notes,
those who said they were most concerned about crime were also
33
much more likely to be racially conservative. Moreover, dog
34
whistling is what social psychologists call “priming.” That is to
say, campaigns use priming to “remind prospective voters of the
electoral relevance of pre-existing political attitudes and
35
perceptions.” López assumes that dog whistling necessarily

26. Id. at 56, 69, 72–73. And, as López notes, using racial appeals to attempt to win
votes, surely does not absolve Goldwater (pp. 48–50).
27. FLAMM, supra note 15, at 31. See also id. at 33, 42–43.
28. Id. at 43.
29. Id. at 42.
30. Scholars have raised questions about the adequacy of the statistics showing that
the crime rate spiked in the 1960s. See Weaver, supra note 15, at 233.
31. LOWNDES, supra note 15, at 74.
32. KATHERINE BECKETT, MAKING CRIME PAY 32 (1997).
33. Id. at 84.
34. Larry M. Bartels, Priming and Persuasion in Presidential Campaigns, in
CAPTURING CAMPAIGN EFFECTS 78, 84–92 (Henry E. Brady & Richard Johnston eds.,
2006).
35. Id. at 84–85 (emphasis added). What is more, Bartels concludes that priming (e.g.,
dog whistling) probably does not much matter electorally. Id. at 92.
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causes people to vote in a certain way, but provides little evidence
to support this assumption.
Whichever way the causal direction runs (a point to which we
will return), Goldwater was far from alone in using the Warren
Court as a rhetorical punching bag. South Carolina Senator Strom
Thurmond of “Dixiecrat” fame (officially named the States
Rights Democratic Party) used the confirmation hearing of
Justice Abe Fortas to replace Earl Warren as Chief Justice to
drive home the “law and order” theme (one might also recall that
Homer Thornberry from Texas was going to take Fortas’s seat
had things gone according to plan; they did not). In the summer
of 1968, when the hearings began, Thurmond wasted little time in
going for Fortas’s jugular:
Does not that decision, Mallory—I want that word to ring in
your ear—Mallory . . . . a man who raped a woman, admitted
his guilt, and the Supreme Court set him loose on a
technicality . . . . Is not that type of decision calculated to bring
the courts and the law and the administration of justice into
disrepute? Is not that type of decision calculated to encourage
more people to commit rapes and serious crimes? Can you as a
Justice of the Supreme Court condone such a decision as that?
36
I ask you to answer that question.

According to historian Rick Perlstein, Fortas sat silent for a
full minute—it is difficult to imagine the “optics” of such in today’s
37
media culture—before declining to answer. No doubt Thurmond
knew that Fortas was not on the bench when Mallory was decided
and the “technicality” was exactly the sort of Southern police
38
conduct the Warren Court was concerned about, but the damage
Thurmond sought to inflict was done (although what finally did in
39
Fortas was his financial improprieties).
As Thurmond’s treatment of Fortas shows, “law and order”
was ascendant as a political catchphrase in the 1960s. No doubt,
law and order was a coded racial appeal, but it cannot be
overlooked that part of the catchphrase’s cogency was “due to the
widespread loss of popular faith in liberalism’s ability to ensure
36. Nominations of Abe Fortas and Homer Thornberry: Hearings before the
Committee on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 191, available at http://www.loc.gov/
law/find/nominations/thornberry/hearing-pt1a.pdf.
37. PERLSTEIN, supra note 21, at 286.
38. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 450–52 (1957).
39. PERLSTEIN, supra note 21, at 382. Fortas’s nomination for Chief Justice was
ultimately filibustered, but he remained on the Court as an associate justice. However,
after Nixon’s election, his financial improprieties came to light and he stepped down, thus
allowing Nixon two appointments early in his first Term.
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personal security. The reaction against the Great Society was
likewise rooted significantly in the perception that it had failed to
40
curb social unrest—and may have even contributed to it.”
López, however, spends one solitary sentence discussing this
social unrest—e.g., the riots in Harlem and elsewhere in 1964, the
Watts riot of 1965, the “long hot summer” of 1967, the rise of the
“Black Power” movement—that had been seared into the
national consciousness in the intervening years. López then
spends just over two pages identifying Nixon’s dog whistling in
1968. According to López: “Nixon had mastered Wallace’s dark
art” (p. 24). Q.E.D.
But scholars who have carefully studied the 1968 Campaign
come to a more nuanced conclusion. Nixon, with Wallace flanking
his right, and Humphrey his left, positioned himself as a racial
moderate, knowing that Wallace’s overheated racial rhetoric was
41
not palatable to the larger voting public. Indeed, Joseph
Lowndes’ study of the modern Right comes to the conclusion that
Nixon’s appeal to racial conservatives late in the campaign was to
not “waste” their vote on Wallace because it would simply help
42
Humphrey. Historian Joan Huff has noted: “Far from being a
bland supporter of civil rights, Nixon’s record was better than any
of the political opponents he ran against . . . with the exception of
43
Hubert Humphrey.” As Nixon’s Health, Education and Welfare
Secretary, Robert Finch, told a group of mostly African American
visitors regarding desegregation: “You’d be better informed if
44
instead of listening to what we say you watch what we do.”
Indeed, Nixon’s electoral margin of victory in 1968 was slim,
and it was his 1972 demolition of liberal lion George McGovern,
as opposed to 1968, where Nixon better connected with voters on
45
the law and order cum “racial problem” issue. In sum, it seems
like a more nuanced conclusion must be arrived at vis-à-vis
Nixon’s rhetoric in 1968. In that year, it was Wallace, not Nixon,
who carried the Deep South states of Louisiana, Mississippi,
Alabama, Georgia and South Carolina, while Nixon focused on
46
the border South states. Law and order certainly had a racial and
40.
41.

FLAMM, supra note 15, at 9.
KEVIN J. MCMAHON, NIXON’S COURT: HIS CHALLENGE TO JUDICIAL
LIBERALISM AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 56–60 (2011).
42. LOWNDES, supra note 15, at 119, 130–31.
43. JOAN HOFF, NIXON RECONSIDERED 78 (1994).
44. MCMAHON, supra note 41, at 65.
45. Id. at 236–37.
46. Id. at 56–57. López fails to note that as far back as 1968, the Democrats were
engaged in their own dog whistling (as we will see, López erroneously traces it back to
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racist component to it, but there is murkiness to Nixon’s dog
whistling, such as it was, during the 1968 campaign.
To be sure, Nixon’s dog whistling did pick up after his
election in 1968, but it is inaccurate to assert, as López does, that
1972 was Nixon’s “first full dog whistle campaign” (p. 26). Despite
discussing Nixon’s generalized dog whistling during his first-term,
López fails to analyze the results of the 1970 mid-term elections.
Nixon and Agnew campaigned hard for their preferred candidates
on the “permissiveness” theme, attacked the federal courts and
47
banged the law and order drum. The rhetoric failed to register
with voters in 1970. As the New York Times gloated in a postmortem: “outside of Tennessee,” the “‘Southern strategy’
encountered disaster everywhere,” further noting that Nixon
failed in pushing the “crime-violence issue;” “rarely,” the
Editorial Board continued, “has a Chief Executive laid down such
48
a hard, aggressive line and pushed it so persistently.” In short,
the 1970 mid-term elections pose a problem for López’s thesis.
During this same time-frame, Federal Appeals Court judge
Warren Earl Burger was appointed Chief Justice, Southerners
Clement Haynsworth and G. Harrold Carswell went down to
ignominious defeats in the Senate, and Harry Blackmun was
confirmed as an Associate Justice. Half of the “Nixon Four” were
in place. Both these Justices were part of the Court’s unanimous
49
opinion in Griggs v. Duke Power, which López calls the “highwater mark for anti-discrimination law” (p. 86)—correctly from a
race-conscious perspective—but he fails to note that the Nixon
Justice Department filed two briefs arguing that the Court should
50
rule in the employees’ favor (which it of course did).
While Blackmun would drift to the left over the years,
eventually becoming a reliable liberal vote, Burger would stay in
the conservative fold at least insofar as criminal cases were

Jimmy Carter with a similarly erroneous analysis of Carter’s alleged dog whistling). At a
1968 Democratic primary debate against Eugene McCarthy, Bobby Kennedy, in response
to McCarthy’s answer to a question about public housing said: “You say you’re going to
take ten thousand black people and move them into Orange County? It is just going to be
a catastrophe.” FLAMM, supra note 15, at 150. Given Orange County’s well-known
conservatism, this was dog whistling at its finest. LISA MCGIRR, SUBURBAN WARRIORS:
THE ORIGINS OF THE NEW AMERICAN RIGHT (2001).
47. MCMAHON, supra note 41, at 136–38.
48. Quoted in MCMAHON, supra note 41, at 140.
49. 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (setting forth a disparate or adverse impact test in the
employment discrimination context regardless of the employer’s intent or motive).
50. MCMAHON, supra note 41, at 198–99.
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concerned; he would move further to the right in the 1980s. 51 But
compared with Nixon’s nomination and subsequent confirmation
52
of Justice “Renchburg,” Burger was moderate. Nixon’s fourth
and final appointment was the conservative Lewis Powell (though
he remained committed to Roe v. Wade throughout his time on
53
the bench).
Nixon, though, did not care much about abortion and the
administration’s reaction to Roe was muted, at most. As Kevin
McMahon has shown, Nixon was not particularly ideological visà-vis all the issues that came before the Supreme Court, but
crafted his rhetoric and nomination strategy for electoral gain,
focusing on the law and order and school desegregation issues in
54
1972. Scholars agree that bussing was the central racial issue of
55
the 1972 campaign, pitting Nixon versus McGovern. While
López is correct that Nixon campaigned heavily on racial issues in
1972 (p. 26), it cannot be omitted (as López does) that by 1972
voters were able to accurately place McGovern and Nixon in their
respective ideological spaces on racial issues—this partially
explains Nixon’s outsized performance with “urban ethnics” in
56
the North. Again, we have to contend with the question of which
way the causal connection is running—preaching or whistling?
Regime politics scholars would fall into the preaching camp,
at least insofar as the newly appointed Justices implementing a
president’s agenda goes. And the Court, with all of Nixon’s
appointees in the majority (along with Justice Stewart’s
concurrence) largely placed an end to the bussing issue with
57
Milliken v. Bradley. Given Nixon’s agenda, also unsurprising was
the Burger Court’s slow but steady devolution of the Warren
Court criminal procedure decisions. Assessing the Burger Court’s
work in 1984, Charles Whitebread concluded: “it is now clear that
51. Lee Epstein et al., Ideological Drift Among Supreme Court Justices: Who, When
and How Important?, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1483, 1498, 1504–05 1515–17 (2007).
52. President Nixon, in discussing Rehnquist in 1971, said: “you remember the
meeting we had when I told that group of clowns we had around there. Renchburg and
that group. What’s his name? . . . . Yeah, Renchquist.” DAVID L. HUDSON, JR., THE
REHNQUIST COURT: UNDERSTANDING ITS IMPACT AND LEGACY 6 (2006). Despite
mangling it twice, Nixon got it right when he announced his nomination of Rehnquist to
the Court.
53. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Powell: Moderation amid Divisions, N.Y. TIMES,
June 27, 1987, at 32 (“On abortion he remained committed, with a shrinking majority, to
the 1973 precedent that established it as a constitutional right.”).
54. See generally MCMAHON, supra note 41.
55. Id. at 233.
56. Id.
57. 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (holding that a “multidistrict, areawide remedy to a singledistrict de jure segregation problem” was beyond the scope of the equal protection clause).
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the crime control model of the criminal process commands a
majority of the present Court. This majority is eager to
accommodate what it perceives as legitimate needs of effective
law enforcement and to assist the police by eliminating legal
58
obstacles whenever possible.” The color-blind jurisprudential
regime was thickening.
While the Burger Court was slowing the pace of racial
liberalism in the 1970s, Nixon was forced to resign as a result of
Watergate and Vice-President Gerald Ford assumed the Oval
Office. In 1976, Ford ran against Georgia Governor Jimmy
Carter. López wants to place the outcome of the 1976 election as
turning on Jimmy Carter’s putative dog whistling in contrast to
Gerald Ford’s alleged refusal to do so: “Moreover, Carter’s racial
pandering— and Ford’s principled failure—seemed to cement the
political logic of race-baiting” (p. 56). López hinges his argument
on one quote by Carter about ethnic neighborhoods and forced
59
integration by government. López then puzzlingly avers that
Carter actually won because of the black vote—African
Americans were “still furious at Nixon’s dog whistling” (p. 56).
60
But Carter was a racial moderate, if not a racial liberal, and
Ford was no shrinking violet when it came to confronting racial
politics. In their first debate, centering on domestic politics,
Carter stated: “We have got a sharp distinction drawn between
white collar crime. The big shots who are rich, who are influential,
very seldom go to jail. Those who are poor and who have no
influence quite often are the ones who are punished.” Meanwhile,
Ford talked about mandatory-minimums: “We believe that we
can do a better job in the area of crime, but that requires tougher
sentencing-mandatory, certain prison sentences for those who
61
violate our criminal laws.”
58. Charles H. Whitebread, The Burger Court’s Counter-Revolution in Criminal
Procedure: The Recent Criminal Decisions of the United States Supreme Court, 24
WASHBURN L. J. 471, 471 (1984).
59. That quote being: “I have nothing against a community that’s made up of people
who are Polish or Czechoslovakian or French-Canadian, or who are blacks trying to
maintain the ethnic purity of their neighborhoods. This is a natural inclination on the part
of the people. I don’t think government ought to deliberately try to break down an
ethnically oriented neighborhood by artificially injecting into it someone from another
ethnic group just to create some form of integration” (pp. 55-56). Carter swiftly apologized
for the remark—in other words, this does not fit into López’s definition of dog whistling,
where the dog whistler denies any racist intent and instead accuses the initial accuser of
playing the race card (pp. 129–34).
60. SEAN WILENTZ, THE AGE OF REAGAN: A HISTORY 1974-2008, 69, 122 (2008).
61. Debate with President Gerald Ford (Domestic Issues) Sept. 23, 1976, available at
http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/5546.
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Carter, for his part, stated in the candidates’ third and final
debate: “I think the greatest thing that ever happened to the
South was the passage of the civil rights acts and the opening up
of opportunities to black people, to have a chance to vote, hold a
62
job, buy a house, go to school, and participate in public affairs.”
Meanwhile, the 1976 Republican Party Platform stated:
Every American has a right to be protected from criminals.
Violence has no place in our land. A society that excuses crime
will eventually fall victim to it. The American people have been
subjected to an intolerable wave of violent crime. The victim of
a crime should be treated with compassion and justice. The
attacker must be kept from harming others. Emphasis must be
on protecting the innocent and punishing the guilty. Prevention
63
of crime is its best deterrent and should be stressed.

Indeed, in an April 1975 speech Ford stated, in what appears
to fit López’s definition of dog whistling quite well: “Too many
Americans had forgotten that the primary purpose of
imprisonment was not to rehabilitate the convicted criminal so
that he could return to society, but to punish him and keep him
64
off the streets.” Here we see Ford and the Republican Party
apparatus hitting all the high-notes from Goldwater’s law and
order operetta. 1976, then, turns López’s dog whistle thesis on its
head.
Meanwhile, the “Nixon Court” was continuing to flex its
muscles during the transition from Carter to Reagan. In 1976, a
scant four years after declaring Georgia’s death penalty scheme
unconstitutional—Justices Brennan and Marshall had it that the
death penalty was always unconstitutional—the Court reversed
65
track in Gregg v. Georgia. All four of Nixon’s appointees
66
(Blackmun concurred) sidelined Furman v. Georgia. This is as
the regime politics literature would predict. Carter, to use
Stephen Skowronek’s term, was a “disjunctive” president, the last
of the New Deal coalition/Civil Rights regime presidents, about

62. Debate with Gerald Ford, Oct. 22, 1976, available at http://www.presidency.
ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=6517.
63. 1976 Republican Platform: A Safe and Just Society, available at
http://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/platform/safejust.htm.
64. Reproduced at http://www.ontheissues.org/celeb/Gerald_Ford_Crime.htm.
65. 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (reinstating the death penalty after a four-year moratorium).
66. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (finding that Georgia’s death penalty scheme was arbitrary
and thus violated the Eight Amendment). A case challenging the Texas death penalty
scheme was consolidated with Furman.
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to give way to a “reconstructive” president: Ronald Reagan. 67 The
Justices appointed by Nixon—Justice Stevens, appointed by Ford,
had not yet bolted for the liberal side and also joined the Nixon
Four in Gregg—were beginning to limit or obviate precedent
from the previous racially liberal jurisprudential regime.
Another sign that racial conservatism had captured the Court
was that “color-blindness” began to pervade the Court’s
decisions, for example in Personnel Administrator of
68
Massachusetts v. Feeney. Although many commentators have
traced the “discriminatory intent” requirement back to
69
Washington v. Davis, López, in a separate piece of scholarship,
has persuasively argued that Feeney marked the death knell for
70
many discrimination claims. The Court now commanded that
the challenged government action must have been because of
instead of in spite of the adverse or disparate impact. In other
words, a litigant could no longer simply show a discriminatory
impact, she would have to show the government acted, essentially,
because it wanted to discriminate (a nearly impossible burden to
meet, even in 1979). Here again, we can see the work of the Nixon
Four continuing to build a color-blind jurisprudential regime: all
four Nixon Justices were on board in Feeney; and only Brennan
and Marshall dissented. The stage was set for the reconstructive
presidency of Ronald Reagan and his desire to reorient the
71
federal judiciary.
Of course, Reagan needed to be elected first. López correctly
notes that Reagan was a master of the dog whistling genre.
Besides the oft-noted example of his 1980 campaign speech at a
county fair just outside of Philadelphia, Mississippi—the site of
the lynching of three civil rights workers in 1966—with an appeal
to state’s rights (p. 58), López points us toward two of Reagan’s
favorite campaign speech stories (p. 58). The first concerns the
Cadillac-driving “welfare queen.” In one such telling, Reagan
recounted: “In Chicago, they found a woman who holds the
record. She used 80 names, 30 addresses, 15 telephone numbers
to collect food stamps, Social Security, veterans’ benefits for four
67. STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE: LEADERSHIP FROM
JOHN ADAMS TO BILL CLINTON, 399–400, 413–19 (2000). Though Skowronek is now
exploring the possibility that reconstructive presidencies may no longer be able to occur.
Stephen Skowronek, Twentieth-Century Remedies, 94 B.U. L. REV. 795 (2014).
68. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
69. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
70. Ian Haney López, Intentional Blindness, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1779, 1825–26, 1829–
34 (2012).
71. SKOWRONEK, supra note 67, at 413–19.
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nonexistent deceased veteran husbands, as well as welfare. Her
tax-free cash income alone has been running $150,000 a year.” 72
Many liberals believed she was a figment of Reagan’s
imagination—he did have a penchant for exaggerating—however,
the Chicago welfare queen was an actual person (Linda Taylor),
and, in fact probably committed crimes far worse than welfare
fraud. 73 But even if she didn’t exist, as the saying goes, someone
would have invented her. López correctly contends that Reagan’s
goal was to connect an indolent black woman and a racialized
welfare system in white voters’ minds (Taylor was African
American, though she passed herself off as various different races
when the situation suited her pecuniary interests).
Perhaps even more explicit than the welfare queen whistle
was the second of Reagan’s stories, this one about a “strapping
young buck ahead of you [in the grocery store checkout line] to
buy a t-bone steak [with food stamps]” while “you were waiting
in line to buy hamburger” (p. 59). As López notes, the “strapping
young buck” eventually morphed into a “young fellow” as the
former was too reminiscent of Wallacian overt racial rhetoric (p.
59).
It is difficult to disagree with López that Reagan’s rhetoric is
not classic dog whistling. It is, however, more complicated to
assert, as López does, that one can draw a causal line from
Reagan’s coded rhetoric to his electoral victory (p. 59). Political
scientist John Sides has shown that the “Reagan Democrats”—
such as they can even be said to exist outside of a media
construct—most likely voted for Reagan based on more mundane
concerns such as the economy rather than dog whistling:
The “New Republicans” [i.e., Reagan Democrats] were not
drawn disproportionately from the middle to lower strata of the
population; their conservatism was not more marked on social
issues than on economic issues; they were neither more religiously
oriented nor more alienated from government than other voters;
finally, they bore little similarity to the constituency that provided
74
the core support for Wallace in 1968.
72. Josh Levin, The Welfare Queen, SLATE (Dec. 19, 2013, 12:41 AM)
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/history/2013/12/linda_taylor_welfare_qu
een_ronald_reagan_made_her_a_notorious_american_villain.html.
73. Id.
74. John Sides, Who Were the Reagan Democrats?, THE MONKEY CAGE, June 16,
2008, http://themonkeycage.org/2008/06/16/who_were_the_reagan_democrats/ (citing
Jerome L. Himmelstein & James A. McRae, Jr., Social Conservatism, New Republicans,
and the 1980 Election, 48 PUB. OPINION Q. 592 (1984)).
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Sides continues: “Himmelstein and McRae find that these
New Republicans supported Reagan for much more ordinary
reasons: they disapproved of the performance of President Carter,
especially with regard to the economy. This kind of behavior—
retrospective voting based on the performance of the national
economy—is well-documented and, well, a lot more pedestrian
than prevailing theories either then or now.” 75 Contemporaneous
polling supports Sides’ argument. 76
Moreover, as political scientist Martin Gilens shows in his
careful study of welfare, the stereotype of “blacks are lazy” dates
back centuries, thus undercutting the notion that Reagan
happened on a novel way to appeal to racial conservatives. 77 And
while it is true that those who still believe in the canard that
“blacks are lazy” are more likely to want to cut welfare and food
stamp benefits, 78 I come back to my earlier question: is this dog
whistling or fellow feeling?
Gilens also shows how the media helped create the
perception of “poor = black” (and thus in need of welfare) well
before 1980, 79 and also points out the confounding factor that,
“[e]ven programs strongly associated with blacks can enjoy high
levels of popular support if the programs are seen as providing
benefits to those who are trying to help themselves.” 80 In light of
the evidence, it is a bridge too far to state that Reagan won the
1980 election because of coded racial appeals.
But what is certain is that more important than mere rhetoric
was Reagan’s ability to remake the federal judiciary and the
Supreme Court. Reagan appointed, in succession, Justice
O’Connor, Justice Scalia and Justice Kennedy, in the interim
elevating Justice Rehnquist to the center seat. When President
Bush then secured the nomination of Justice Thomas there was a
contingent, to varying degrees, of five racial conservatives on the
Court. (As the Right’s intonation, “No more Souters,” from the
aughts appointments of Roberts and Alito suggests, that
75. Sides, supra note 74. Kevin McMahon has argued that the term “Reagan
Democrats” is a misnomer and properly placed in electoral time, they might better be
called “Nixon Democrats.” MCMAHON, supra note 41, at 246–48.
76. BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION
305 (2009).
77. MARTIN GILENS, WHY AMERICANS HATE WELFARE: RACE, MEDIA AND THE
POLITICS OF ANTIPOVERTY POLICY 154–56 (1999).
78. Id. at 76–77.
79. Id. at 102–53.
80. Id. at 214.
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appointment did not turn out as planned). 81 Their racial
conservatism can be seen through this lens. The Reagan Justice
Department’s stated goal was to roll back the liberal federal
82
judiciary. Attorney General Edwin Meese gave speeches
expressing the desire to limit the reach of the Warren Court’s
83
criminal procedure decisions and end affirmative action.
Outside of the higher education affirmative action context,
the Court has accomplished these racially conservative goals.
During the 1980s and the 1990s, the Court fought over the proper
standard of review for affirmative action programs. The names of
84
these cases are well-known to students of the Court: Fullilove,
85
86
87
Croson, Metro Broadcasting and Adarand. As the liberal
Justices left the Court, Justice O’Connor, in Adarand, won the
long war and the Court eventually settled on strict scrutiny for
racial classifications. Of course, the standard of review was critical
because contrary to the Court’s judicial rhetoric, strict scrutiny,
insofar as race-conscious claims are concerned, is almost always
fatal in fact.
The Rehnquist Court’s criminal law jurisprudence also shows
the color-blind jurisprudential regime in action. Some have tried
to argue to the contrary. Rachel Barkow, for example, has argued
for a revisionist interpretation of the Rehnquist Court’s criminal
88
justice cases. Using the attitudinalists as (an easily knocked
89
down) straw man, Barkow argues that the Court’s conservatives
81. Jeffrey Rosen, No More Souters, MINNEAPOLIS STAR-TRIBUNE, (May 6, 2009,
7:02 AM), http://www.startribune.com/opinion/44410512.html.
82. Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as Political Practice: The Right’s Living
Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545, 547 (2006).
83. Edwin Meese, Constitution Day Speech, Sept. 17, 1985 available at
http://www.heritage.org/initiatives/first-principles/primary-sources/returning-to-originalmeaning-attorney-general-meese-looks-to-the-declaration-and-the-constitution.
84. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
85. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
86. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
87. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
88. Rachel Barkow, Originalists, Politics and Criminal Law on the Rehnquist Court,
74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1043 (2006).
89. MARK A. GRABER, A NEW INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM, x (2013); EILEEN BRAMAN, LAW, POLITICS, AND PERCEPTION:
HOW POLICY PREFERENCES INFLUENCE LEGAL REASONING (2009) (showing that legal
norms are a non-nominal factor affecting the justices’ voting behavior); Cornell W.
Clayton, The Supreme Court and Political Jurisprudence: New and Old Institutionalisms,
in SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES 15, 22-30
(Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999); see also Cornell Clayton & Howard
Gillman, Introduction, in THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS 2 (Howard
Gillman & Cornell Clayton eds., 1999) (describing the new institutionalism as “[s]cholars
seeking to explore the broader cultural and political contexts of judicial decision making”);
Charles R. Epp, External Pressure and the Supreme Court’s Agenda, in SUPREME COURT
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sometimes voted in surprising ways in non-death penalty cases.
90
But pointing to Justice Scalia’s Confrontation Clause revival or
91
the Court’s sentencing guidelines cases as evidence of the
Rehnquist’s Court putative mixed or limited partiality to criminal
defendants is not persuasive.
The Confrontation Clause cases necessarily focus on what
happens at trial—but the federal criminal trial is dead to all but
92
those who can afford to hire a skilled and expensive lawyer. Only
three percent of federal criminal defendants ever exercise their
Seventh Amendment right that will trigger their Sixth
93
Amendment confrontation clause right. The same holds true in
the sentencing guidelines cases where the Court took away some
94
judicial discretion and placed it back in the jury’s hands. These
cases are relatively meaningless in the larger political picture, and
fit the picture of cases that the New Right regime does not care
about. Indeed, Barkow admits that the conservatives on the Court
have voted in ways consistent with the New Right regime in death
penalty cases, a line of jurisprudence important to the regime, as
95
seen by the attention Reagan and his successor placed on it.
Moreover, the Rehnquist Court voted in favor of the government
nearly 80 percent of the time in Fourth Amendment cases, cases
that are central the criminal justice mores of the Republican
DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES DECISION-MAKING 255
(Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999) (undercutting attitudinalists who
argue that the Justices grant certiorari to cases to pursue their personal political goals by
noting that the Justices can only take those cases that are litigated, and if the ACLU, for
example, ceased to bring lawsuits it would be difficult for the judges to pursue a civil
liberties agenda as aggressively); Mark A. Graber, The Non-Majoritarian Difficulty:
Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7 STUDIES AM. POL. DEV. 35 (1993).
90. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
91. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (holding that the sentencing
guidelines were no longer mandatory); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004)
(holding judge cannot enhance sentence based on facts not found by a jury or admitted by
the defendant); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (holding the Sixth
Amendment requires aggravating factors that will enhance a sentence must be found by a
jury).
92. Indeed, one could cheekily argue that since only those with the financial means
can go to trial, perhaps this decision fits the attitudinal model; but this mostly just shows
how weak the attitudinal model can be in placing some cases in their proper ideological
space.
93. Human Rights Watch, An Offer You Can’t Refuse, (Dec. 15, 2013),
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2013/12/05/offer-you-can-t-refuse. The picture does not
improve much even when one considers state criminal trials. Richard A. Oppel, Jr.,
Sentencing Shift Gives New Leverage to Prosecutors, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2011, at A1.
94. Almost needless to say, the holding of Booker regarding deviating from the
sentencing guidelines is of huge importance for cases whether tried or pled out, but it is
not an issue that the New Right regime cares much about (as opposed to criminal
procedure scholars).
95. Clayton & Pickerill, supra note 7, at 1415.
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Party. 96 In this instance, the received wisdom about the Rehnquist
Court needs no revision.
But our high politics story should not get too far ahead of our
low politics story. And there might not be a better example of low
politics than the Willie Horton ad that President Bush used
against Michael Dukakis in 1988. Willie Horton, in López’s
recounting, was almost singularly responsible for Bush’s victory:
“[t]he commercial hit its mark with deadly accuracy. From lagging
his opponent, Bush gained ground and took the lead” (p. 106).
This is the conventional wisdom held by many commentators. But
it is not quite as simple as that. John Sides shows:
The real story of the Willie Horton and the 1988 campaign is
about how few people likely saw the ad itself, how it was
actually news coverage that brought Horton into Americans’
living rooms, and how Horton’s impact on voters disappeared
before Election Day . . . . The Republican convention was
particularly important. It took Bush from a double-digit deficit
at the beginning of August to a narrow lead at the end of that
month. After that, Bush never lost the lead. This is something
that conventional accounts of the Willie Horton ad rarely
97
mention: Dukakis was already behind when the ad appeared.

The extent to which the Willie Horton ad actually affected
the 1988 election is not knowable to a scientific certainty (or
anywhere close), but the “Willie Horton ad beat Dukakis”
analysis seems more campaign lore than what we know about the
larger structural forces (the “fundamentals”) that help explain
98
presidential electoral outcomes.
As we have now seen, the dog whistle thesis is beginning to
look like it lacks much explanatory purchase. Nevertheless, López
remains doggedly devoted to his thesis. To explain President
Clinton’s victory over President Bush in 1992, López again
focuses on dog whistling while downplaying other factors. López
99
seizes on Clinton’s “Sister Souljah” moment, which sent the
96. Id.
97. John Sides, The Real Impact of the Willie Horton Ad, 2012 (unpublished op-ed
on file with the author) (emphasis in original). Indeed, López also puts much stock in Tali
Mendelberg’s study of the Willie Horton ad (pp. 176–78). However, her critique has been
subject to revision.
98. See, e.g., JOHN SIDES & LYNN VAVRECK, THE GAMBLE: CHOICE AND CHANCE
IN THE 2012 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 11–13 (2013).
99. As López explains: “Clinton accepted an invitation to speak at a convening
hosted by [Jesse] Jackson, and then to the dismay of the assembled audience used the
occasion to upbraid a young rap artist, Sister Souljah, for heated comments about the
recent riots in Los Angeles as well as racially offensive lyrics” (p. 109). Sister Souljah had
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national press into a tizzy, and Clinton’s decision to fly home to
Arkansas during the campaign to preside over the execution of a
mentally impaired black man, Ricky Ray Rector. López captures
the dog whistling politics of the moment by quoting Clinton as
saying: “I can be nicked a lot, but no one can say I’m soft on
100
crime” (p. 109).
Curiously, though, López elides here what he characterizes
early on as one of the significant components of dog whistling:
“As one among a range of ‘social issues’ used by conservatives,
racial dog whistle politics can be understood as part of a larger
effort to flimflam voters . . . .” (p. 29). López continues:
“Righteously attacking social liberalism becomes a surreptitious
way to defeat economic liberalism” (pp. 29-30). In other words,
López identifies attacking social liberalism as an important
corollary to the GOP’s strategy to implement economic policy
that is “wrecking” the middle class.
However, when attempting to explain Bush’s 1992 loss,
López finds that “[d]ivisive cultural politics” were “off-putting to
moderates” (p. 107); thus, the electorate turned to Clinton. One
must wonder, and López does not explain such, why moderate
voters did not go for conservatives “stok[ing] cultural divisions as
cover for a politics that primarily serves the very wealthy” in 1992
(p. 30). Why do voters sometimes hear the dog whistle, and,
apparently, sometimes ignore it?
López also partially misinterprets Clinton’s actions while in
office, pointing to welfare reform (pp. 109-10). While Clinton did
promise on the campaign trail to “end welfare as we know it,”
once in office he did little toward that end. It was only after the
1994 Republican wave election that Clinton began to act on
welfare reform. López states: “Clinton ended Aid to Families with
Dependent Children, a welfare program for impoverished
children that had been a staple of the New Deal approach since
1936, but which the right had trashed in racist terms for
encouraging poor black women to have children out of wedlock”
(pp. 109-10). This is a tendentious reading of history. First, Aid
for Dependent Children (as the program was initially known), was
initially constructed so that benefits would go primarily to poor
stated: “If black people kill black people every day, why not have a week and kill white
people?” Sheila Rule, Rapper, Chided by Clinton, Calls Him a Hypocrite, N.Y. TIMES, June
17, 1992, at A22.
100. López is fair enough to note that Rector’s mental impairment came as a result of
a failed suicide attempt after Rector had killed a civilian and a police officer, something
that most commentators fail to note (p. 108).
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whites and not to poor blacks; Southern Democratic Senators saw
101
to this. Second, every president from Johnson through Reagan
102
made various attempts to reform welfare. Thus, an effort to
reform welfare is not a particularly compelling example of
racialized politics.
In contrast to his previous analysis, López sees little to no dog
103
whistling during the 2000 campaign. Instead, López’s dog
104
whistling target changes course after 2000. López, because he
wants to focus on anti-Muslim American dog whistling during the
George W. Bush presidency, points the reader to Ashcroft v.
105
Iqbal, where Iqbal was essentially racially profiled and detained.
But this case is more likely to end up in a civil procedure textbook,
not a constitutional law one. The case turned on the majority’s
perfunctory application of Feeney and a raising of the bar to plead
facts with sufficient particularity under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. A better example of such high court dog whistling that
López omits is Justice Scalia’s speech, unveiled after 9/11, titled:
Mullahs of the West: Judges as Authoritative Expositors of the
Natural Law? As I have noted elsewhere, “Scalia, almost needless
to say, was analogizing alleged ‘[liberal] judicial hegemony’ with
Islamic fundamentalism. Beyond the ten-dollar words, the speech
106
is dog whistling to the right.”
Though López briefly discusses Regents of the University of
107
California v. Bakke (p. 87), he fails to discuss Grutter v.
108
Bollinger. The latter poses problems for his thesis that the
conservative coalition has used dog whistling to benefit the
“super-rich” (p. xii). López does not note, for example, that the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce filed an amicus brief opposing the
affirmative action program in Bakke, but 25 years later, as
explicitly cited by Justice O’Connor in upholding the University
101. IRA KATZNELSON, WHEN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION WAS WHITE 43–48 (2005).
102. GILENS, WHY AMERICANS HATE WELFARE 179–83 (1999).
103. But this is problematic. One need look no further than the South Carolina
primary, when Bush broke Reagan’s Eleventh Commandment—an apocryphal progenitor
of the saying, as it were—and attacked insurgent John McCain via a whisper campaign that
McCain had fathered an African American child out-of-wedlock. Elisabeth Bumiller,
McCain Parries a Reprise of 2000 Smear Tactics, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2008, at A1.
104. López does not discuss Clinton’s victory over Bob Dole in 1996.
105. 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
106. Calvin TerBeek, Rethinking Scalia’s Legacy, BALLS & STRIKES (July 10, 2014),
http://constitutionalpoliticsdotcom.wordpress.com/2014/07/10/rethinking-justice-scaliaslegacy/.
107. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
108. 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (upholding the University of Michigan Law School’s
affirmative action program).
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of Michigan law school’s affirmative action program, corporations
had changed their tune—they wanted the program upheld.
Fortune 500 companies such as American Express, Coca-Cola,
Dow Chemical and General Electric filed a brief in support of the
109
affirmative action program. One scholar has maintained that
this seeming contradiction, the Court supporting a race-conscious
policy despite its overall bent toward colorblindness, is best
explained because the Justices are elites and elite preference is for
race-conscious affirmative action policies in the higher education
110
context. However, this explanation is on shaky ground. Whether
the elites’ preferences continue to be taken into account remains
111
to be seen. As Fisher v. Texas works its way back up the judicial
ladder (again)—Justice Kennedy dissented in Grutter—the colorblind jurisprudential regime may finally realize Reagan’s goal of
ending affirmative action in all contexts. Perhaps the simplest
explanation is that Justice O’Connor was a country-club
Republican, a dying breed, and Justice Kennedy, when it comes
to racial matters, is not, excepting his proclivity for limiting the
112
death penalty in certain cases.
113
To his credit, López does discuss Shelby County v. Holder,
where the Court’s racial conservatives told us: “We also noted
that “[t]hings have changed in the South. Voter turnout and
registration rates now approach parity. Blatantly discriminatory
114
evasions of federal decrees are rare.” Shortly thereafter,
conservative controlled state legislatures, a number of them in the
115
South, passed laws designed to restrict voting. In a study of
voter-restrictive laws passed in state legislatures from 2006-2011,
researchers found that the “proposal and passage [of the laws] are

109. Their collective amicus brief can be found at http://supreme. lp.findlaw.com/
supreme_court/briefs/02-241/02-241.mer.ami.sixtyfive.pdf.
110. Neal Devins, Explaining Grutter v. Bollinger, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 347 (2003);
DESMOND & KING, HOUSE DIVIDED, supra note 4, at 108-09. For a cogent critique of elite
higher education policy, see SUZANNE METTLER, DEGREES OF INEQUALITY: HOW THE
POLITICS OF HIGHER EDUCATION SABOTAGED THE AMERICAN DREAM (2014).
111. Fisher v. Texas, 758 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 2014).
112. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008) (sexual assault of a child is
not death penalty eligible crime); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (death penalty
does not extend to juveniles).
113. Shelby Cnty v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013)
114. Id. at 2625, citing Northwest Austin Municipal Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557
U. S. 193 (2009).
115. Alana Semuels, New Voter ID Laws: Nothing like it ‘since Reconstruction,’ L.A.
TIMES (May 4, 2014, 4:53 PM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-voteridentification-laws-state-by-state-20140504-story.html.
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highly partisan, strategic and racialized affairs.” 116 As cultural
critic Louis Menand acerbically noted in response to Shelby
117
County: “What’s so changed about that?”
But perhaps the apotheosis of the color-blind jurisprudential
regime can be found in Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion in Parents
Involved. 118 Running the gamut of the regime’s cases 119 (e.g., Shaw
120
v. Hunt, Adarand, Bakke and Milliken), Roberts struck down
school desegregation programs in Seattle and Louisville, then
claimed the mantle of Brown for the color-blind regime. Roberts
ended his opinion with this statement (almost certainly intended
to appeal to the media): “The way to stop discrimination on the
basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.” 121
One year after Parents Involved came down, the nation
elected its first black president. The 2008 election was the most
racialized election in modern American history, as political
122
scientists David O. Sears and Michael Tesler have shown. In
discussing this election, López focuses largely on the petty crimes
of right-wing provocateurs and Sarah Palin, but the McCain
123
campaign team largely refrained from dog whistling. This was
because McCain did not need to. As an initial matter, racial
liberals overwhelmingly supported Obama even in the
Democratic primaries, and racially conservative Democrats—
despite also being gender conservatives—voted for Hilary
Clinton: “racial attitudes were so powerful that they actually
made Hilary Clinton the preferred choice of modern day sexists in
124
the Democratic primaries.”
The general election followed the same arc. Even after
controlling for all the relevant variables, Sears and Tesler found
that racial resentment was more prominent in 2008 than any other
125
modern presidential contest. As President Obama’s chief
116. Keith G. Bentele & Erin E. O’Brien, Jim Crow 2.0? Why States Consider and
Adopt Restrictive Voter Access Politices, 11 PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICS 1088 (2013).
117. Louis Menand, The Color of Law, NEW YORKER, July 8, 2013, at 80, 89.
118. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 (Parents Involved), 551
U.S. 701, 748 (2007).
119. Richards & Kritzer, supra note 12.
120. 517 U.S. 899, 909–10 (1996) (“an effort to alleviate the effects of societal
discrimination is not a compelling interest”).
121. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 742–43.
122. MICHAEL TESLER & DAVID O. SEARS, OBAMA’S RACE: THE 2008 ELECTION
AND THE DREAM OF A POST-RACIAL AMERICA (2010).
123. Id. at 55. López correctly points out that Hilary Clinton engaged in some of her
own coded racial rhetoric in the Democratic primary (pp. 111–12).
124. TESLER & SEARS, supra note 123, at 8 (emphasis in original).
125. Id. at. 59–60.

TERBEEK LOPEZ_DRAFT 2 (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

12/29/2014 3:13 PM

BOOK REVIEWS

189

pollster incisively told Gwen Ifill after Obama’s victory: “The
thing is, a black man can’t be president of America, given the
racial aversion and history that’s still out there . . . However, an
extraordinary, gifted, and talented young man who happens to be
126
black can be president.”
After López finishes his analysis of Romney’s loss in 2012
127
and the Tea Party, he attempts to flesh out exactly how the
middle class have been dog whistled into misery. Earlier in the
book, López asserts that “[r]acial demagoguery convinces many
whites to think about government in terms of race, and then to
reject liberalism and the lessons of the New Deal in favor of the
nostrums promoted by corporate titans and loaded insiders” (p.
74).
To find support for this, López turns to Thomas Frank’s
polemic What’s the Matter With Kansas, which he finds
“persuasive” (p. 169). Indeed, López thinks Frank’s thesis—that
conservatives vote for Republicans based on social issues (e.g.,
“guns, gays and god”) instead of voting for Democrats, which is
in their economic interest—only fails insofar as it does not
understand the power of dog whistle racism: “it’s also clear that
race contributes to broad-based support for regressive policies
that wreck the middle class” (p. 170).
However, Frank’s thesis has been thoroughly debunked.
Political scientist Larry Bartels, reviewing What’s the Matter With
Kansas?, has shown that the definition of “white working class”
utilized by Frank is imprecise at best:
Even in 2004, after decades of increasingly widespread college
education, the economic circumstances of whites without
college degrees were not much different from those of America
as a whole. Among those who voted, 40% had family incomes
in excess of $60,000; and when offered the choice, more than
half actually called themselves “middle class” rather than
“working class.” Meanwhile, among working-class white voters
who could even remotely be considered “poor” – those with
incomes in the bottom third of the national income distribution

126. Quoted in TESLER & SEARS, supra note 123, at 56 (emphasis in original).
127. Given the largely economic nature of the issues surrounding the 2012 election,
López focuses more on the conservative media provocateurs (e.g., Ann Coulter, Rush
Limbaugh, Pat Buchanan, Roger Ailes). López is on point when he sniffs out the racial
resentment animating the Tea Party that other scholars have failed to note (p. 151), but
when he attempts to connect his thesis to Romney’s economic agenda it stretches it to the
breaking point (pp. 162–67).
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– George W. Bush’s margin of victory in 2004 was not 23
128
percentage points but less than two percentage points.

Moreover, as Jeffrey Stonecash (another political scientist)
shows in his book Class and Party in American Politics, “lessaffluent whites have not moved away from the Democratic Party
129
and . . . class divisions have not declined in American politics.”
While rich states tend to vote Democratic, rich persons vote
Republican, and while poor states tend to lean Republican,
130
poorer voters vote for the Democratic candidate. “Indeed, lowincome voters’ presidential preferences in 2004 were considerably
more influenced by economic [rather] than cultural issues, while
131
high-income voters showed no such differentiation.” The
empirical fact is that income has been a strong predictor of
132
support for Republicans among voters since the 1950s. Simply
put, López’s argument that dog whistling has “wrecked” the
middle class by convincing working-class and middle class whites
to vote based on conservative social issues does not stand up to
scrutiny.
So where does that leave us? López’s thesis—that dog
whistling has wrecked the middle class—is not borne out by the
facts. Dog whistling cannot explain electoral victories, never mind
economic inequality, nor does the Court, outside of the
idiosyncratic Justice Scalia, appear to dog whistle. Indeed, it may
even be too much to say that dog whistling is reinvented racism.
Naomi Murakawa has argued that one can trace “law and order”
rhetoric back to the New Deal: “national leaders explicitly and
routinely addressed black civil rights in criminological terms—
and they did so nearly two decades . . . before the Goldwater
133
presidential campaign of 1964.” Vesla Weaver has come to
134
similar conclusion.
While we can jettison dog whistling as the explanation for the
New Right regime, it seems clear that López is right to focus on
race, even if his specific thesis is lacking. Racial politics matter
deeply in the United States and they affect almost every policy

128. Larry Bartels, What’s the Matter with Kansas?, 1 QUARTERLY J. POL. SCI. 201,
205 (2006).
129. JEFFREY M. STONECASH, CLASS AND PARTY IN AMERICAN POLITICS 118 (2000).
130. ANDREW GELMAN ET AL., RED STATE, BLUE STATE, RICH STATE, POOR STATE
(2008).
131. TESLER & SEARS, supra note 123, at 15.
132. Bartels, supra note 128, at 208–09.
133. Murakawa, supra note 15, at 235.
134. Weaver, supra note 15, at 240–42, 265.
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area. 135 White Americans are racially conservative, Republicans
136
and Democrats alike (though the latter somewhat less so).
Indeed, Latinos are racially resentful toward African
137
Americans. Thus, while elites may utilize racial rhetoric,
perhaps the more pragmatic explanation is that they are talking
to a significant segment of American voters. One is reminded of
George Wallace’s quote: “I started off talking about schools and
highways and prisons and taxes—and I couldn’t make them listen.
Then I began talking about niggers—and they stomped the
138
floor.” While such rhetoric would be a miserable failure today,
the point is that elites will not return to and reshape rhetoric that
voters are unresponsive to. From the brief sketch I have given
above, preaching to the choir seems a safer causal bet than dog
whistling.
Turning back to the Court: because the New Right regime is
made of up of racial conservatives, this explains the creation of a
color-blind jurisprudential regime that now stretches back to the
1970s, long enough that Chief Justice Roberts can easily rely on
friendly precedent to beat back “race-conscious” constitutional
arguments. Though the law reviews are beset with criticism of
what they term “color-blind jurisprudence” and the obligatory
139
normative call to a “race-conscious” alternative, they do so in
an intellectual vacuum. This does not help us understand all the
political forces at work, as I have made a modest attempt to do so
here. The New Right regime may be in decay—or Obama may be
just another Clintonian disjunctive president—but the color-blind
jurisprudential regime has grown quite thick since the 1970s. And
the Court’s racial conservatives—Scalia is the oldest, approaching
80-years old, never mind that two of the Court’s racial liberals,
Justices Breyer and Ginsburg, may not have much time left—are
likely to continue to reject race-conscious policy issues that
become constitutionalized in the near future. Affirmative action
in the higher education context may soon fall (as noted above),
and the color-blind jurisprudential regime will continue to
135. Some scholars have tried to argue that racial conservatism has been subsumed by
economic conservatism. NOLAN MCCARTY, KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL,
POLARIZED AMERICA: THE DANCE OF IDEOLOGY AND UNEQUAL RICHES 2 (2006). But
as King and Smith have shown, this is an overreach. KING & SMITH, supra note 4, at 258–
68.
136. TESLER & SEARS, supra note 123, at 19–20.
137. Id. at 97–98.
138. CARTER, supra note 14, at 109.
139. See, e.g., Tanya Keteri Hernandez, “Multi-Racial Discourse: Racial
Classifications in an Era of Color-Blind Jurisprudence, 57 MD. L. REV. 97, 161–70 (1998).
López’s prescription for ending dog whistling does not much improve on this (p. 221–30).
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facilitate law-enforcement goals, in spite of the fact that the War
140
on Drugs has disproportionately affected minorities. After all,
“an effort to alleviate the effects of societal discrimination is not
141
a compelling interest.” Racial liberals should expect victories in
the Court to be few and far between in the foreseeable future.
In sum, before scholars can proceed forward with useful
normative claims about racial politics, we need to get the
descriptive details correct first. If my analysis above is correct, dog
whistling appears to be barking up the wrong descriptive tree. It
is difficult, but not impossible, to tease out the role of race in
American politics and more empirically-minded scholarship is
needed on this point. Indeed, a rich research agenda is begging to
142
be acted on here. What is more, because the Court plays an
outsized role in determining the constitutionality of many racial
policies, a better understanding of the Court’s role is crucial to the
descriptive story as well. Until that much is accomplished, we will
simply continue to keep on whistlin’ Dixie.

140. MARK A. R. KLEIMAN, WHEN BRUTE FORCE FAILS 23-24 (2009); AMY E.
LERMAN & VESLA M. WEAVER, ARRESTING CITIZENSHIP: THE DEMOCRATIC
CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICAN CRIME CONTROL 41–45 (2014).
141. Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 909–910 (1996).
142. I have pointed to some of the few scholars who are working toward this goal:
Rogers Smith, Desmond King, Vesla Weaver, Naomi Murakawa, the late William Stuntz,
Carol Steiker, James Forman, Jr., Jeffrey Fagan, Jennifer Hochschild and Marie
Gottschalk, to name a few.

